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1. Introduction 
In these trying times, the German economy suffers from lockdowns and restrictions necessary 
due to the COVID-19 crisis. Much of that bill is footed by the taxpayer through a stimulus 
package worth 170 billion euros, enacted by the federal Government to combat recession.1 It is 
likely that such government spending will at some point in the future require higher tax revenue. 
The Social Democrats2 (SPD) and the Socialists3 (Die Linke) have used this opportunity to revive 
the idea of taxing wealth.  
Reintroducing a wealth tax is an election campaign evergreen. It might be because the wealth 
tax is automatically understood as only taxing the rich.4 Estimates assume that only 0.17%5 to 
0.2%6 of taxpayers would be subjected to such a wealth tax and it appears that taxes paid by 
others enjoy popularity amongst the electorate. Currently the Social Democrats,7 the Greens,8 
and the Socialists9 support its reintroduction. These political declarations have been discussed 
in detail in the past and especially the socialdemocratic concept resembles the former German 
wealth tax that existed until 1996.10 The concept of the Social Democrats with a 1% tax on 
wealth above 2 million euros or 4 million euros for married couples could generate additional 
annual tax revenues of approximately 11.5 billion euros.11 The proposal of the Socialists with a 
5% tax rate for wealth above 1 million euros could even raise 100 billion euros annually.12 These 
concepts provoked criticism as they – in combination with other taxes – would lead to a 
combined tax rate of approximately 62-63% according to the socialdemocratic proposal and up 
to 121% with the parameters suggested in the socialist proposal.13 
This essay concludes that although the wealth tax was judged unconstitutional in 1995 a wealth 
tax can be justified in the German taxation system. Nonetheless it is submitted that the tax is 
likely to remain undesirable due to its manifold negative side effects. This essay will analyse the 
workings of German wealth tax and review the reasons why the wealth tax was judged 
unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court (5). In order to scrutinise the Court’s 
ruling, it is necessary to explore the role of wealth taxation in Germany (1), its history (2), its 
design (3), and especially its justifications (4). 
  
                                                 
1 Greive und Hildebrand 2020. 
2 Frankfurter Rundschau 2020. 
3 Die Linke 2020. 
4 Tipke 1996 p. 10; Essers 2014 p. 374. 
5 Siemers und Birnbaum 2013 p. 13. 
6 Bach und Beznoska 2012 p. 68. 
7 SPD 2019. 
8 Bündnis90/Die Grünen 2020. 
9 Die Linke 2019. 
10 Häuselmann 2012 p. 1680; Schwarz 2017 p. 46. 
11 Cf. Bach und Beznoska 2012 p. 8; Kube 2013b p. 3. 
12 Spengel et al. 2013 p. 17. 
13 Zipfel 2013 p. 2205. 
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2. Wealth taxation within the German tax system 
Like all developed states, Germany has a variety of different taxes.14 The fundamental principle 
of the German taxation system is the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle with the aim to tax according to 
financial capacity.15 Financial capacity manifests itself in income, wealth and consumption.16 
Each expression of financial capacity may be taxed at the discretion of the legislator within the 
bounds of the constitution.17  
The former wealth tax (Vermögensteuer) that existed in Germany until 31 December 1996 
charged the net wealth of an individual at an annual 1% rate. Land property was and is 
additionally subject to an immovable property tax (Grundsteuer) which remains the only tax on 
ownership of wealth in Germany as of today.18 
Income tax (Einkommensteuer) taxes income and partially also covers capital gains as Germany 
does not have a stand-alone TCGA. Profits emerging from agriculture, businesses and 
independent professions are mainly taxed based on the income theory of von Schanz,19 also 
known as the Schanz–Haig–Simons income. Thus, capital gains arising within these commercial 
activities are taxed as income. Income from employment, capital, leasing and specified other 
income are taxed under the ‘source rule’ developed by Fuisting.20 According to this ‘source rule’ 
private capital gains are only taxed if there is a specific provision bringing it within the scope of 
the tax. The range of such specific provisions for private capital gains was moderately extended 
after the end of the wealth tax in 1996.21 Yet, apart from the disposal of capital investments, 
private disposals remain mostly tax free if the assets have been held for a year or – in case of 
immovable property and its associated rights – for ten years.22 Corporate earnings are taxed 
under the special regime of corporate taxation (Körperschaftsteuer), which is based on the 
income taxation of businesses with adjustments for opaque entities (such as companies or 
foundations). All business income from individuals or opaque entities is also subject to a 
business tax (Gewerbesteuer).  
Taxes on consumption include, for example, value added tax, energy tax, and taxes on specific 
goods such as e.g. coffee, beer, and sparkling wine. 
  
                                                 
14 Kube 2013a p. 40.  
15 Hey 2018 § 3 recital 40. 
16 Hey 2018 § 3 recital 56; Kube 2014 p. 347. 
17 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 46 (juris). 
18 Hey 2018 § 3 recital 60.  
19 Schanz 1896. 
20 Fuisting 1904 pp. 50. 
21 Scheffler 2013 p. 55; Hey 2020 recital 862. 
22 Cf. §§ 17, 20, 23 EStG (German Income Tax Code).  
 
5 
 
3. History of wealth taxation in Germany 
Simple forms of wealth taxes have been imposed in Germany since the Early Middle Ages.23 
First, they included only immovable property and were sporadically imposed. As the importance 
of commerce and trade grew, these taxes gradually became more comprehensive by including 
movable property as well. Increasing financial needs and military spending perpetuated them as 
regular tax levies.24 Until the 19th century taxation on wealth remained a surrogate for taxing an 
approximate income.25 Later in the 19th century, policy shifted towards taxing income directly. 
Wealth taxation, however, did not cease. In 1893, the first modern wealth tax was enacted in 
Germany with the Prussian wealth tax.26 The Prussian wealth tax stood alongside the Prussian 
income tax, making the wealth tax a supplementary tax.27 It was tasked to charge the special 
financial capacity represented in both the predictable income deriving from wealth28 and in the 
owner’s economic standing and credit worthiness.29  
In 1919, the Weimar Republic introduced a one-off net wealth tax (Reichsnotopfergesetz) with 
rates between 10-65% to fund the costs imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. The 
payment was, however, spread over time to avoid an excessive burden on the taxpayer. 
However, high inflation soon drained its tax revenue.30 Subsequently, in 1922, the first 
national31 regular annual wealth tax with rates from 0.1-1% was introduced. Opaque and 
transparent entities became tax subjects and the tax base included assets inept to yield any 
income such as jewellery and art.32 Minor changes to the rate (0.5% to 0.75%) took place in 1925. 
In 1934, members of transparent entities were subjected to the tax instead of the entity and a 
uniform tax rate of 0.5% was introduced.33 In 1946, the Allied Control Council increased tax 
rates to 1-2.5%.34 These rates increased again to 3% in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. 
In addition, in 1952 the Federal Republic of Germany enacted a one-off wealth tax of 50% 
payable by instalments until 1979. The regular wealth tax rate was lowered to 0.75% in 1952 
and again to 0.7% in 1974.35 Furthermore, in 1974, the possibility to deduct wealth taxes paid 
against income and corporate tax was removed.36 This removal underlined the independence of 
the wealth tax: It was no longer a mere supplement to the income tax but an independent tax on 
the substance of wealth.37 Tax rates were lowered for natural persons to 0.5%38 and for opaque 
entities to 0.7 in 1978 and once more to 0.6% in 1984.39 In 1992, companies were permitted to 
                                                 
23 Horn 1978 p. 56. 
24 Wieland 2003 p. 4. 
25 Birk 1999 p. 12; Kube 2013b pp. 10; Kube 2014 pp. 350, 370. 
26 Oechsle 1993 p. 1369; Arndt 1999 p. 27; Schwarz 2017 p. 38; Wachter 2020 recital 27.91. 
27 Bach und Beznoska 2012 p. 11.  
28 Wieland 2003 pp. 6; Kube 2014 pp. 350. A detailed analysis of the 1893 wealth tax can be found at 
Oechsle 1993. 
29 Wieland 2003 pp. 6. 
30 Wieland 2003 p. 11. 
31 Bach und Beznoska 2012 p. 12. 
32 Wieland 2003 pp. 11; Schwarz 2017 pp. 39. 
33 Wieland 2003 p. 12; Schwarz 2017 p. 40. 
34 Allied Control Council Law No. 13; Wieland 2003 p. 13. 
35 Wieland 2003 p. 13; Schwarz 2017 pp. 41.  
36 Wieland 2003 p. 13; Bach und Beznoska 2012 pp. 12.; Schwarz 2017 pp. 41 
37 Cf. Weber-Grellet 1996 p. 1417.  
38 Bach und Beznoska 2012 pp. 12; Schwarz 2017 p. 42. 
39 Schwarz 2017 p. 42. 
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use their more favourable income tax balance sheet value to determine the value of their 
business assets40 and in 1995 the tax rate for natural persons rose to 1%.41 
The Democratic Republic of Germany also had a wealth tax with rates between 0.5 to 2.5%. 
State-owned companies were exempt from the tax.42 The tax was largely meaningless, as there 
were very few wealthy individuals or private companies in the socialist state. After reunification, 
no wealth tax was charged in eastern Germany due to a special provision,43 which raised 
constitutional and European law issues.44 
In 1995 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled the valuation of assets subjected to wealth tax 
unconstitutional as the valuation preferred immovable property over other forms of property.45 
The court held that the tax in its unconstitutional form could only be charged until the end of the 
assessment period to 31 December 1996.   
Taxes with revenue assigned to the German states (Bundesländer), like the wealth tax, can only 
be altered by joint legislation of the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) together with the Federal 
Council of German States (Bundesrat).46 The Federal Council, dominated by Social Democrats, 
passed a proposal to alter the unconstitutional valuation provisions and thus maintain the 
wealth tax.47 The Conservatives (CDU) and Liberals (FDP) governing on the federal level, 
however, were in favour of abolishing the wealth tax altogether.48 The result of this gridlock was 
neither an abolishment nor a reform of the tax which then ceased to apply on 31 December 
1996.49  
  
                                                 
40 Schwarz 2017 p. 42. 
41 Bach und Beznoska 2012 p. 13; Wachter 2020 recital 27.92. 
42 Cf. Duda 2011 pp. 128. 
43 § 24c VStG (Wealth Tax Code). 
44 Cf. Meyding 1992 p. 1115; Deutscher Bundestag 1996b p. 87. 
45 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 47 (juris). 
46 Art. 106 (2), 105, 72 Grundgesetz (German Federal Constitution). 
47 Deutscher Bundestag 1996b. 
48 Deutscher Bundestag 1996b p. 87. A summary of the debates in the committees can be found at 
Beichelt 1997 pp. 169. 
49 Arndt und Schumacher 1995 p. 1816; Schüppen 1997 p. 225; Schwarz 2017 pp. 44.  
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4. The wealth tax in its most recent design until 1996 
Natural persons residing in Germany as well as (more unusually for a wealth tax) opaque entities 
with their management based in Germany were subject to unlimited wealth tax on their 
worldwide wealth.50 There were no special provisions for newly arrived immigrants. Thus, they 
were subject immediately to wealth tax on their worldwide estate. Foreign wealth taxes on 
wealth situated abroad could be credited against the German tax, if no relevant Double Taxation 
Agreements were applicable.51 Natural persons and opaque entities without residence or 
management based in Germany had a limited tax liability and were only liable in respect of the 
wealth situated in Germany.52  
Debt and other obligations reduced the tax base subject to certain limited restrictions.53 Debt 
taken out in relation to goods not subject to wealth tax could not be deducted against 
chargeable assets.54 Debt in connection with the purchase, extension or improvement of 
chargeable assets, or debt without any connection to wealth, such as medical bills, were 
deductible.55 Borrowings taken out to pay the wealth tax itself was deductible.56 Non-residents 
could reduce their wealth tax liability by buying German property subject to wealth tax with 
debt secured on immovable property or ships registered in Germany even if they could afford 
to buy it outright.57 
There was no cap on the total wealth tax paid related to the level of income. However, in 
individual cases, taxpayers could apply for deferral or exemption under the hardship clause,58 
which had rather high requirements such as threatening the livelihood of the taxpayer.59 
Natural persons had a tax exempt allowance of 120,000 deutschmarks (60,000 euros), married 
couples (unless they were living permanently separated) had a tax allowance of 240,000 
deutschmarks (120,000 euros) and for each minor child living and assessed with the taxpayer an 
allowance of 120,000 deutschmarks (60,000 euros) was added. An additional allowance of 
50,000 deutschmarks ( 25,000 euros) was granted when the taxpayer was older than 60 or 
highly disabled for at least three years.60 A 100,000 deutschmark (50,000 euro) allowance was 
granted for certain entities that engaged in agriculture and forestry.61 Opaque entities were 
only taxed when their tax base exceeded 20,000 deutschmarks (10,000 euros) and taxpayers 
with limited liability only when their tax base was above 20,000 deutschmarks (10,000 euros).62 
The tax was an annual tax which was regularly reassessed every three years.63 
                                                 
50 §§ 1, 4 VStG (Wealth Tax Code). 
51 § 11 VStG (Wealth Tax Code) and § 121 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
52 §§ 2, 4 VStG (Wealth Tax Code). 
53 § 118 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law); BFH, Urteil vom 13.11.1964; Falterbaum et al. 1995 pp. 580. 
54 Falterbaum et al. 1995 p. 580. 
55 Falterbaum et al. 1995 pp. 580. 
56 Cf. Falterbaum et al. 1995 p. 577. 
57 § 121 subsection 1 No. 7 and subsection 2, §118 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
58 Cf. Weber-Grellet 1996 p. 1416. 
59 Cf. FG München, Urteil vom 29.07.2003 recital 14 and 15 (juris). 
60 § 6 VStG (Wealth Tax Code). 
61 § 7 VStG (Wealth Tax Code). 
62 § 8 VStG (Wealth Tax Code). 
63 § 15 VStG (Wealth Tax Code). 
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The tax rate was 1% for natural persons, but only 0.5% for agricultural and forestry wealth as 
well as business assets, including transparent entities, and shares or stocks. Opaque entities 
were subjected to a tax rate of 0.6%.64 
Asset valuation 
Asset valuation was rather complex as it involved four different valuation methods. Some asset 
classes had an additional threshold value to be regarded in the tax base. Other asset classes 
were adjusted with a multiplier. For example, assets of national interest that were accessible for 
public education and research were assessed at only 40% of their value.65  
The standard valuation method was based on a fair market value for the asset in question when 
sold individually (gemeiner Wert).66 Another method was a fair market value for the asset when 
sold with the operating business unit (Teilwert).67 The latter had a very limited scope in the 
wealth tax as it was only used to determine the value of certain obligations from pensions 
schemes.68 Special rules applied to agricultural and forestry assets, immovable property, 
business assets and enumerated other property.69 Even though all wealth was subjected to the 
same tax rate, different assets were valued with different valuation methods and thus some 
assets were effectively subject to significantly lower tax rates. 
Leased immovable property, immovable property used for business purposes, immovable 
property of mixed usage, as well as single and double family homes were assessed with a net 
income value method (Ertragswertverfahren).70 Other developed land was assessed with a cost 
method (Sachwertverfahren).71 The value for immovable property was to be determined every 
six years (Einheitswert).72 However, contrary to this provision, such valuations in practice 
happened only in 1935 and then again in 1964 for immovable property situated in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. To roughly capture the increase in land values without the need for a new 
determination, another 40 % of the 1964 value was added to immovable property value from 
1974.73 Nonetheless, by the early 1990s the 1964 values represented only 6 to 30% of the fair 
market value.74 
The assets of businesses with management based in Germany were assessed every three years75 
at their income tax balance sheet values, except for immovable property with a determined 
value available. The first 500,000 deutschmarks (250,000 euros) worth of business assets were 
excluded from the tax base. Business asset wealth above 500,000 deutschmarks (250,000 
euros) was only brought into the tax base at 75% of its value.76 
Other wealth was valued at its fair market price.77 This included, for example, bank balances, 
capital claims, stocks, inventions, and copyrights if they were not owned by the inventor, the 
                                                 
64 § 10 VStG (Wealth Tax Code) and § 110 (1) No. 3 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
65 § 115 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
66 § 9 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
67 § 10 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
68 § 104 (4) § 117a BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
69 § 18 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
70 §§ 76, 78-82 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
71 §§ 76, 83-90 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
72 §§ 19 ff. BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
73 § 121a BewG 1996 (Valuation Law); Meyding 1992 p. 1114.  
74 Meyding 1992 p. 1115. 
75 §§ 21, 98a BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
76 § 117a BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
77 § 9 § 110 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
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creator, or their heirs. Precious metals, stones, and pearls worth more than 1,000 deutschmarks 
(500 euros) were brought into the tax base as was jewellery worth more than 10,000 
deutschmarks (5,000 euros). The tax base further comprised art and collections worth more 
than 20,000 deutschmarks (10,000 euros) provided the artist was dead. If the owner of the art 
irrevocably pledged to make the art available to the public for at least five years in exhibitions 
organised by a corporation of public law or a publicly subsidised corporation of private law an 
exemption was given.78  
Other wealth included not yet due claims against a pension fund, but with major exceptions: for 
example, claims against a work-related pension fund, or claims that become due after the 
taxpayer turned 60 or was unable to pursue his work, or claims against the public social security 
system were excluded from the tax base.79 Pension funds themselves were tax exempt if they 
met certain criteria similar to criteria used for their tax exemption in income taxation.80  
Costs and intake 
One argument frequently brought forward against a wealth tax is its collection costs. However, 
these costs are disputed.81 Some experts claim that costs would consume up to 43% of the 
collected intake,82 whereas others only suggest a cost of 32% of its revenue.83 Others remain 
doubtful about these high numbers since costs related to other taxes – such as the immovable 
property tax – are comprised in the data.84 Lower estimates put collection costs at 1.8%85 or at 
3.3%86 of its revenue yet it remains unclear whether these numbers include costs associated 
with immovable property value determination. The federal Government estimated the 
collection costs at 4-4.5% of its intake but without immovable property value determination 
costs.87 Another study calculated these costs at 10.8% with 20% of immovable property value 
determination costs attributed to the wealth tax.88 It appears that the preferred estimate 
depends heavily on the position in the political spectrum. Regardless, most studies suggest that 
the collection cost of the wealth tax was well above the average cost of other taxes at about 
1.87% as estimated in 1983,89 rendering the wealth tax the most expensive tax to collect.90 The 
main cost driver was the determination of immovable property values: 6-9%91 of civil servants 
at the tax authorities were preoccupied with assessment of immovable property. Additional 
costs would have been incurred if the immovable property value determination, which had not 
been performed since 1964 in the western part or 1935 in the eastern part of Germany, were 
conducted every six years as prescribed by law. It is estimated that this task alone would have 
required 4,000 to 5,000 new civil servants to be employed.92 Taxpayers themselves incurred an 
additional cost factor: It was estimated that compliance took 28% of their tax declaration time 
among those liable to the wealth tax and compliance costs for the taxpayer were estimated to 
                                                 
78 § 110 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
79 § 110 and § 111 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). Cf. Falterbaum et al. 1995 pp. 544. 
80 § 3 BewG 1996 (Valuation Law). 
81 An overview of estimations since 1977 can be found at Spengel et al. 2013 pp. 80. 
82 Loeffelholz, Rappen und Fritzsche (1988); Cf. Spengel et al. 2013 p. XII. 
83 Cf. Meyding 1992 p. 1116; Tipke 1995 p. 1180; Lang 1999 p. 3. 
84 Birk 1999 p. 18. 
85 Bach und Beznoska 2012 p. 6. 
86 Resolution Proposal of the Socialdemocratic Parliamentary Group Deutscher Bundestag 1996a p. 2. 
87 Statement of the Federal Government in Deutscher Bundestag 1996b p. 87; Beichelt 1997 p. 170; 
Wieland 2003 p. 70. 
88 Bauer 1988 p. 386; Spengel et al. 2013 p. 83. 
89 Bauer 1988 p. 279. 
90 Lang 1999 p. 1; Birk 1999 p. 18; Kube 2013b p. 22. 
91 Meyding 1992 p. 1116 (6-7 %); Tipke 1995 p. 1180 (8-9 %). 
92 Meyding 1992 p. 1116. (for the western states); Rid 1994 p. 5; Loritz 1995 p. 11 (for the entire country).   
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be as high as 12.3% of the intake – albeit the composition of wealth tax return related activities 
and their time requirements used in this study remain vague.93  
Wealth tax raised approximately 7.8 billion deutschmarks – the equivalent of approximately 4 
billion euros – in 1996.94 This represented 1% of the entire tax revenue95 or about 0.2% of the 
GDP.96  
Former wealth Tax – tax planning and evasion 
Wealth tax was prone to underreporting and tax evasion.97 Assessment of wealth such as art, 
jewellery, and other luxury goods depended largely on the truthfulness of the taxpayer. These 
kinds of wealth have rarely been reported and there was effectively little authorities could do 
other than to rely on the taxpayers’ honesty in reporting.98 There was, however, no evasion of 
land property in Germany as the land register notified tax authorities when ownership 
changed.99   
Opaque entities were subjected to wealth tax on corporate level with a tax rate of 0.6% and their 
owners were again subjected to the tax on their individual level with a tax rate of 0.5%. Thus, 
careful tax planning involved transparent entities100 as the wealth tax discriminated against 
opaque entities.101 Like their opaque siblings, transparent entities enjoyed the valuation by 
balance sheet values, the exclusion of the first 500,000 deutschmarks (250,000 euros) and 
assessment of only 75% of the wealth above 500,000 deutschmarks (250,000 euros). The 
difference was that owners of transparent entities faced a tax rate of only 0.5% and no tax on 
entity level. 
Another scheme often used to minimise wealth tax involved a shift of business assets abroad 
into foreign permanent establishments or into foreign opaque entities. Although wealth held in 
other jurisdictions was equally subject to the tax if held by German residents, often double 
taxation agreements assigned sole taxation rights to the source country.102 
For an individual to emigrate from Germany was not a viable option as exit taxation could keep 
the individual within the German tax net for another ten years. This rule applied to a taxpayer 
who had unlimited German tax liability for at least five out of the last ten years and who moved 
to a foreign jurisdiction with lower taxation on income but retained substantial economic 
interests in Germany. As a result, wealth situated outside Germany not subjected to a foreign 
wealth tax comparable to the German wealth tax, remained subject to German wealth tax for 
ten years for emigrants from Germany of any nationality.103 Under all circumstances, all assets 
within Germany continued to be subjected to the wealth tax wherever the individual was 
resident.104  
                                                 
93 Cf. for references and critical analysis of these numbers Spengel et al. 2013 pp. 80. 
94 Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2018; Lang 1999 p. 3; KPMG 2012 p. 6; Wachter 2020 recital 27.95. 
95 Tipke 1995 p. 1180; KPMG 2012 p. 6.  
96 Bach und Beznoska 2012 p. 13. 
97 Bach und Beznoska 2012 p. 59.  
98 Birk 1999 p. 18. 
99 § 29 (4) BewG 1996 (Valuation Law); Birk 1999 p. 18.  
100 Schwarz 2017 p. 366. 
101 Also admitted by the Federal Government at the time Deutscher Bundestag 1996b p. 87. 
102 Schwarz 2017 p. 367. 
103 §§ 2, 3 AStG 1996 (Foreign Tax Act). 
104 § 121 BewG (Valuation Law).  
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Foreign trusts or foreign foundations were not effective in reducing the tax burden if the settlor 
and his family (defined to include any fiancé, fiancée, spouse, those related in direct line and their 
spouses, sibling with their offspring and their spouse, sibling of the sibling’s spouse, siblings of 
the parents and those living together in a child-parent-like relationship (foster children))105 were 
entitled to more than half of the income or had more than half of the economic ownership. In 
these cases, wealth and income of these entities were attributed transparently to the settlor or 
alternatively to the beneficiaries.106 These individuals would be subjected to the tax even if they 
had not received any funds yet, potentially forcing them to apply for a deferral or an exemption 
under the hardship clause. 
Another tax planning opportunity arose through the deductibility of debt.107 With additional 
equity discrimination wealth taxation deepened the debt-equity divide.108 
  
                                                 
105 § 12 StAnpG and § 15 AO (General Tax Code). 
106 § 12 StAnpG or today § 15 AStG (Foreign Tax Act).  
107 Spengel et al. 2013 pp. XI. 
108 Cf. Hey 2020 recitals 731, 862. 
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5. Former wealth tax justifications 
A variety of justifications is put forward in favour of a wealth tax. Under the caption of the 
‘ability-to-pay’ principle it is argued that wealth itself confers financial capacity through funded 
income as wealth owners save provident expenses and social insurances. Their income could be 
considered secured and predictable (Fundustheorie).109 Furthermore, it is claimed that wealth 
itself contains financial capacity (Vermögensbesitztheorie).110 These and other justifications are 
discussed further in the main evidence papers to the project conducted by the Wealth Tax 
Commission. It is notable that these two justifications were used in the accompanying materials 
to the Prussian wealth tax.111 The wealth tax reform of 1974 abandoned the funded income 
theory as social security for workers improved from 1893112 and investments were less immune 
to losses.113 Thus, the 1974 reform relied solely on the assumption that wealth itself contains 
financial capacity.114  
Admittedly, owning wealth increases creditworthiness and social prestige and thus contributes 
to financial capacity. Yet, this approach remains unsatisfactory as both are difficult to value.115 
It is difficult to see why creditworthiness and social prestige drawn from wealth should justify 
taxation, but an increase of said benefits from other attributes such as improved education or 
enhanced negotiation skills, i.e. human capital, should be tax free.116 This unequal treatment, 
however, may be explained by law makers’ wide discretion to choose which manifestation of 
financial capacity to tax and which not to tax.117 The scope of the tax base is discussed further in 
Evidence Paper 8.  
In the academic discussion it was further argued that wealth creates financial capacity because 
its income is effortless (Theorie des mühelosen Ertrages)118 and it enables more leisure time 
(Freizeittheorie)119. Both ideas are problematic. First, leisure and effort are both hard to value 
as the saying ‘find a job you enjoy doing, and you will never have to work a day in your life’ 
underlines. Second, tax is blind to circumstances of income as even income from criminal 
activities is subjected to tax.120 Hence, it is difficult to comprehend that associated leisure or 
efforts should justify a tax.121 Thus, the idea of leisure time being part of financial capacity was 
righteously labelled ‘beyond eccentric’.122 But also the concept of effortless income is to be 
rejected as agricultural or business wealth often requires plenty of work.123  
The benefit principle (Äquivalenzprinzip) justifies a tax by state services available to the 
individual taxpayer. This might have been a convincing theory in times when wealth consisted 
of immovable property and state services were limited to fending off armed intruders. But since 
                                                 
109 Cf. Horn 1978 p. 57; Fischer 1978 pp. 349; Bechstein 1997 pp. 56; Wieland 2003 pp. 7, a summary of 
its criticism can be found on p. 18; Oechsle 1993 p. 1370. 
110 Cf. Bechstein 1997 p. 60; Wieland 2003 pp. 13.  
111 Wieland 2003 p. 10. 
112 Stucken 1954 pp. 3. 
113 Oechsle 1993 pp. 1373; Arndt 1999 p. 28.  
114 Legislative proposal of the Federal Government, Deutscher Bundestag 1972 p. 51. 
115 Tipke 2003 p. 926. 
116 Bechstein 1997 pp. 60.; Arndt 1999 p. 29.  
117 Cf. for the wide discretion BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 46 (juris). 
118 Cf. Bechstein 1997 pp. 64. Birk 1999 p. 15. 
119 Cf. Haller 1981 pp. 47; Bechstein 1997 pp. 66. 
120 § 40 AO (General Tax Code). 
121 Fischer 1978 pp. 347. 
122 Cf. Loritz 1995 p. 10; Arndt 1999 pp. 29 (“beyond eccentric“); Wieland 2003 p. 21 (“depends on the job 
motivation“). 
123 Cf. Fischer 1978 pp. 346; Loritz 1995 p. 10; Arndt 1999 p. 29. Wieland 2003 p. 20.  
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then, the benefit principle has become outdated. Prima facie it is still tempting to argue that the 
state provides a legal order which is a prerequisite to property ownership. Yet, this argument 
loses its strengths as every taxable economic activity relies on some form of public order 
maintained by the state. Thus, it is nowadays recognised that there is no such connection since 
state services are available regardless of prior contributions.124  
The idea that a wealth tax can be justified as some sort of instalment for inheritance tax is also 
doubtful.125 Inheritance tax is charged according to the wealth transferred to the heir who is 
subjected to the sole tax liability. Inheritance tax is more of an income tax for the heir than it is 
a tax on the wealth for the deceased.126 Logically this justification would allow the heir to deduct 
any wealth tax paid during the life of the testator against the inheritance tax bill which of course 
the German inheritance tax did not allow.127  
Another argument presented is that wealth unlike labour can be passed to the next generation. 
However, the ability to pass wealth to the next generation does not justify a wealth tax as the 
wealth transfer to heirs will be subject to inheritance tax.128  
Another justification suggested is the redistribution of wealth.129 Critics of this theory argue 
that a wealth tax is an inept tool as its impact is too small to make a meaningful difference.130 
Any wealth tax inducing significant redistribution would face constitutional difficulties due to 
its proximity to confiscatory taxation.131 Further, most wealth tax revenue is derived from 
business assets and business owners will pass the costs of the tax on to the customers and thus 
deprive the tax of any redistribution effect.132 
It is also claimed that a wealth tax incentivises taxpayers to direct wealth into higher yield 
investments.133 In this concept, a wealth tax ensures a minimum taxation supplementing the 
income tax. Taxes might be used for purposes other than fiscal ones, such as nudging the 
taxpayer to a certain behaviour.134 Some argue, however, that in order for this argument to hold, 
income tax needs a reward for those adhering to the intended behaviour. This reward, it is 
claimed, does not exist as the income tax code denies a deduction of the wealth tax paid against 
the income tax base.135 Yet, this criticism overlooks that a reward for good conduct is not 
necessary: it is sufficient that those taxpayers exceeding minimum taxation are not penalised as 
they avoid substance taxation. 
The assertion that a wealth tax incentivises consumption136 also fails to provide a convincing 
justification. Although wealth taxes discriminate against savers and favour spenders137, they 
                                                 
124 Oechsle 1993 p. 1374; Bechstein 1997 p. 69; Arndt 1999 pp. 27; Wieland 2003 pp. 16. 
125 Bechstein 1997 pp. 74. 
126 Tipke 2003 pp. 872; cf. BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995a recital 21 (juris); Schwarz 2017 p. 67. 
127 Cf. Wieland 2003 pp. 22.  
128 Tipke 2003 p. 928. 
129 Cf. Bechstein 1997 pp. 79; Tipke 2003 pp. 931. 
130 Birk 1999 pp. 13. 
131 Oechsle 1993 p. 1375.  
132 Tipke 1995 p. 1180; cf. Wieland 2003 pp. 24.  
133 Cf. Bechstein 1997 p. 77. 
134 Cf. § 3 AO (General Tax Code). 
135 Oechsle 1993 p. 1374; Bechstein 1997 pp. 77.  
136 Cf. Bechstein 1997 pp. 84. 
137 Tipke 1995 p. 1180. Also admitted by the Federal Government at the time Deutscher Bundestag 
1996b p. 87. 
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may only advance consumption. Any interest advantage in consumption deferral is subjected to 
income tax138 unless the advantage is made by untaxed private capital gains. 
A wealth tax cannot be justified as a remedy for shortcomings of the income tax. The political 
decision to disregard most private capital gains for income tax purposes hardly makes the 
argument for a wealth tax.139 Further, a wealth tax cannot work as a control mechanism for 
income tax. It is an inadequate tool to uncover income tax evasion, as those who evade income 
tax are not likely to then report their wealth accurately.140 Even if a desire for tax honesty is 
diagnosed, other tools have proven to be more effective: since the fall of the wealth tax the 
collection of capital income has improved as it was redesigned as a withholding tax and 
international information exchange enabled fiscal authorities to verify taxpayers’ returns.141 
Finally, arguments justifying the tax simply because it was an established tax throughout the 
ages142, or because it yields tax revenue, also exist.143 Both approaches, however, lack 
persuasiveness. Mere tradition should not be beyond doubt. This is especially true for the 
wealth tax with its eventful history and changing functions.144 Tax revenue itself does not 
provide a convincing justification either as results should not justify the means. 
In summary, different approaches are brought forward to justify wealth taxation. While most 
approaches are to be rejected outright, two justifications hold: the first is that financial capacity 
is drawn from wealth ownership itself. The second is that a wealth tax is an incentive to bring 
wealth into use to avoid substance taxation. Thus, wealth taxation can be justified.  
 
  
                                                 
138 Cf. Wieland 2003 p. 25.  
139 Cf. Bechstein 1997 pp. 69; Wieland 2003 p. 22. 
140 Cf. Bechstein 1997 pp. 72; Wieland 2003 p. 23; Kube 2013a p. 42; Scheffler 2013 p. 55. 
141 Scheffler 2013 p. 55. 
142 Oechsle 1993 p. 1375.  
143 Cf. Fischer 1978 p. 351; Bechstein 1997 pp. 81.  
144 Birk 1999 p. 12. 
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6. The end of the former wealth tax  
Problems over valuation determination were a regular issue in the Federal Constitutional 
Court.145 In 1991, the Fiscal Court of Rhineland-Palatinate, one of the German Länder, 
submitted the question of whether the wealth tax violated the constitutional principle of equal 
treatment, as immovable property enjoyed a valuation far below fair market value compared to 
other types of property that were evaluated on a fair market price basis.146 The federal 
Constitutional Court ruled the wealth tax did violate the constitution for this reason. In addition, 
and going one step further, the presiding Second Senate of the Court elaborated on more 
general tax matters:  
In their obiter, the Court purported that wealth falls under the constitutional protection of 
property.147 Further, the Court believed, based on the 1893 Prussian role model, that the 
taxpayers’ financial capacity was increased by funded income and the wealth tax had a solely 
supplemental character.148 Thus, the Court concluded that a wealth tax may only tax expected 
income and must reprieve the wealth’s substance under ordinary circumstances.149  
This approach is problematic for two reasons: firstly, these remarks were not relevant for the 
case decided, prompting some experts and the dissenting opinion in the judgement to argue the 
Court abandoned judicial restraint.150 The presiding Second Senate of the Court labelled these 
remarks as ‘main reasons’151. However, this was a thinly veiled attempt to confer a legal status 
upon these remarks, expanding the scope of the constitutional protection of property.152 The 
other senate of the federal Constitutional Court then used the next opportunity to reaffirm 
unambiguously that state-induced obligations to pay – such as taxes – are not subjected to the 
constitutional protection of property unless they have a confiscatory effect.153 Secondly, the 
Court disregarded that wealth tax was by its design a tax on substance. While it is true that the 
1893 Prussian wealth tax was also justified by the idea that funded income confers a special 
financial capacity, the tax was also always – and since 1974 solely – justified by financial 
capacity derived from wealth itself.154 Moreover, since 1922, the wealth tax has included assets 
such as jewellery which did not yield any income.155 Lastly, income tax and wealth tax lacked any 
connection. While it was possible for taxpayers to reduce their income tax by deducting paid 
wealth tax starting from 1949, this deductibility was abolished in 1974, leaving no link between 
these two taxes.156  
                                                 
145 Schwarz 2017 p. 72 with references. 
146 FG Rheinland-Pfalz, Vorlagebeschluss vom 04.11.1991. 
147 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 49 (juris). Cf also the dissenting opinion at BVerfG, 
Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recitals 91-96 (juris). 
148 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 56 (juris); criticism with further references at Hey 2018 
recital 62. 
149 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 50 (juris). 
150 Weber-Grellet 1996 pp. 1415; BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recitals 82-88 (juris).  
151 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 48 (juris). 
152 Wieland 2003 pp. 43. For the role of judge Paul Kirchhoff, whose doctrines were adopted in the obiter 
judgement cf. Tipke 1996 p. 9; Wieland 2003 p. 37. 
153 BVerfG, Urteil vom 08.04.1997 recital 131 (juris). 
154 See above and especially Legislative proposal of the Federal Government, Deutscher Bundestag 1972 
p. 51. 
155 Cf. the dissenting opinion at BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recitals 91-96 (juris); Wieland 2003 
pp. 11; Schwarz 2017 pp. 39. 
156 Oechsle 1993 p. 1374; Cf also the dissenting opinion at BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 
108 (juris). 
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But even if the Court’s understanding is assumed to be correct, the judgement raises many 
additional issues. It would be necessary to reconcile a tax on expected income with a regular 
income tax on materialised income as they both tap into the same resource of financial 
capacity.157 Systematically, it is also accepted that the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle is based on actual 
and not potential financial capacity. For example, income tax is blind to what someone could 
have earned but for some reason did not.158 It is hard to see why this principle should be altered 
especially if the wealth tax is classified as some kind of income tax.  
Moreover, the Court stated that ‘about’ 50% of the income earned must remain with the 
taxpayer after taxes are paid.159 This cap was, however, not exercised and criticised as an obiter 
remark, which was confirmed by the same senate with an entirely different composition a 
decade later.160 
Despite being obiter, these remarks played into the hands of Chancellor Helmut Kohl who 
promised in January 1991 to abolish the wealth tax.161 The Federal Government162, and since 
then also other wealth tax opponents163, argued these obiter remarks stipulated requirements 
leaving no room for a reasonable wealth tax. 
 
  
                                                 
157 Cf. also the dissenting opinion at BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 106 (juris). 
158 Tipke 2003 pp. 918; cf. Essers 2014 p. 380. 
159 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 22.06.1995b recital 53 (juris), criticism in the dissenting opinion at recital 98 
(juris). 
160 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 18.01.2006 recital 29 (juris). 
161 Meyding 1992 p. 1115. 
162 Deutscher Bundestag 1996b, p. 87; Birk 1999 p. 7. Joined by Meyding 1992, a seasoned practitioner 
according to Tipke 1996 p. 15. 
163 Cf. Möstl 2003 p. 722. 
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7. Outlook and conclusion 
The orthodox opinion among German legal scholars rejects a wealth tax.164 A reintroduction of 
a wealth tax would meet several challenges. Firstly, reintroducing wealth tax today would create 
more tax planning opportunities than when the initial tax was abandoned in 1996 as 
globalisation in general, and the integration of the common market within the European Union, 
offer new possibilities.165 Therefore, any new wealth tax would arguably be more prone to tax 
avoidance and create the need for complexity-adding anti-avoidance legislation. Secondly, a 
wealth tax adds another millstone in global tax competition. Thirdly it is detrimental to 
attracting investments.166 These arguments are all considered in the main evidence papers of 
the Wealth Tax Commission – see in particular Evidence Paper 11 and Evidence Paper 12. 
Fourthly, and most challengingly, any new wealth tax design needs to address the high collection 
costs incurred by its predecessor (See Evidence Paper 11 for further discussion of possible costs 
in the UK). As explained, the former wealth tax was notoriously ineffective, and a new wealth 
tax could raise similar problems. It was estimated that a new wealth tax could require between 
5,000-12,500 new civil servants for immovable property assessment alone.167  
The introduction of a new tax would also raise special interests: those arguing in favour of 
securing jobs wish to exclude business assets and those who prefer avoiding higher rent prices 
would argue in favour of the tax to exclude immovable property with rental apartments. Each of 
these aims may be well intended. Yet, each exception would need to be justified under the 
constitutional equal treatment rule and if enacted would make the tax even more ineffective as 
the tax yield would decrease while maintaining its collection costs. Evidence Paper 8 
(Chamberlain) discusses these issues and Evidence Paper 9 deals with valuation.  
In conclusion, a wealth tax can be justified in Germany as wealth comprises financial capacity 
and has a nudging effect. Yet, the side effects of a wealth tax like its high collection costs for 
fiscal authorities and taxpayers alike, substance taxation, its proneness to tax avoidance and its 
potentially detrimental effects in the global competition to attract businesses and investments, 
make it less desirable. If the state is in further need for funds, raising the income tax rate is easier 
to administer for tax authorities and easier to comply with for taxpayers. If this is not sufficient, 
other sources of income tax revenue – such as a comprehensive taxation on private capital 
gains – could be reviewed before resorting to a wealth tax.  
 
  
                                                 
164 Cf. Mönter 1971 pp. 68; Tipke 1996 p. 14; Lang 1999 p. 2; Birk 1999 pp. 7.  
165 Cf. Spengel et al. 2013 pp. 74; Schwarz 2017 p. 380. 
166 Spengel et al. 2013 pp. 61; Essers 2014 p. 374; Siemers und Birnbaum 2013 p. 13. 
167 Cf. Schwarz 2017 p. 145 (5,000-10,000); Spengel et al. 2013 p. 80 (7,500-12,500). 
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